Sovereign credit ratings estimate the future ability and willingness of the sovereign governments to service their commercial and financial obligations in full and on time. The process of evaluating the nations and assigning ratings is a business involving various international rating agencies. Governments seek the credit ratings so as to improve their access to the international capital markets. The sovereign credit ratings are an important scale for determining the cost of borrowing to a country. The ratings provide a perception to the lenders about the level of credit risk of the national governments. However, the reliability of the ratings has been a matter of debate in the past due to the methodology followed by the rating agencies.
The present paper attempts to check the reliability of these ratings by considering the ratings assigned by two of the major international rating agencies -Moody's and Standard and Poor's. This is done through comparison of the ratings assigned by them and checking whether the difference is significant and responsive for the countries rated by both. A regression analysis of the ratings and some of the commonly used indicators by the two agencies to determine the ratings is also done.
The results indicate an increase in the average rating difference of the two agencies over time and that the difference in the ratings assigned by the two agencies is statistically significant. Moreover, these agencies are also found to be non-responsive to each other's ratings. This raises reasonable doubts on the consistency of these ratings as the methodology followed by these agencies involves several common determinants. The regression of the ratings over the determinants indicate that the ratings of these two agencies have more or less the common determinants except the 'external balances' indicator exclusively determining the S&P ratings. Considering the fact that the ratings provided by these two agencies are significantly different from each other, the differences in the ratings could be explained by the differences in the weights attached to the determinants by the two agencies. However, a test of significance for the differences in weights of the given set of indicators attached by the two agencies reveals that there is no significant difference in the weights. Thus, the differences can also be attributed to the weights attached to the subjective criteria used by these agencies in order to decide the ratings. Such criteria imply the qualitative biases built by the agencies against nations on the basis of social and political conditions and their reactions to news regarding the changes in the capital markets of a nation. T he history of the credit ratings agencies goes back to the early 20th century when Moody's and Standard and Poor's (S&P) used to publish ratings for corporate securities in America. Later in the 1920s, Fitch also began its business of rating the corporates. Despite this, the initial spread of the rating business was only limited to the US. It is only in the last thirty years that these agencies have spread their services to other nations. Moreover, the process of rating countries began only in the 1970s when S&P and Moody's rated only the US and Canada, Australia being added later by Moody's. The sovereign ratings actually took off in the 1980s and 1990s and by the year 2000, the major companies were rating about 100 nations each. (Klein, 2004) . The international credit rating agencies such as Moody's, S&P, and Fitch have many a times faced criticism for being unreliable and non-transparent in providing credit ratings to nations. The recent financial crisis that hit many of the developed nations resulted in a threat to the credit standing of nations such as the US and the UK (Reuters, 2009) . The credit rating agencies also went about downgrading the rating of countries such as Greece in April 2010. There have been various opinions regarding this downgrading of Greece and its impact on other European nations. (Paphitis and Pylas, 2010; Wachman and Fletcher, 2010) . Two of the agencies, S&P and Fitch, also indicated a threat to the credit standing of India during June, 2008 and stated that they might downgrade. (The Financial Express, 2009 ).
Credit rating of any entity is the estimation of the ability of banks, financial, and non-financial institutions, and the corporate bodies to service their debt obligations effectively and on time. It analyses various factors or types of risks that affect the ability of these institutions to service their debts. These obligations involve interest and/or principal amount repayment of the various rated instruments such as bonds and deposits. Apart from these institutions, credit rating is also done for an economy as a whole. This type of credit rating for nations or states within a nation is known as 'sovereign credit rating'. Such a rating estimates the future ability and willingness of the sovereign governments to service their commercial and financial obligations in full and on time. It is a forward looking estimate of default probability of governments. In the context of the international capital market, the sovereign credit ratings have a great significance. Governments seek the credit ratings so as to improve their access to the international capital markets. The sovereign credit ratings are an important scale for determining the cost of borrowing to a country. These ratings provide a perception to the lenders about the level of credit risk of the national government. The changes in these ratings have an effect on the terms of borrowing available to a country. Sovereign ratings are important not only for the governments but also for the assessment of other borrowers of the same nationality. The ratings that are assigned to the non-sovereign entities are generally not greater than that assigned to their home countries (Standard and Poor's, 2006) .
Given the background of the sovereign credit ratings, the issue of the reliability of the ratings and the process followed by the agencies become relevant. These ratings have often been a matter of debate for the methodology followed by the rating agencies being transparent, on one hand, and the possibility of them being affected by subjective opinions rather than objective analysis and their consequences, on the other hand. An early pioneer research by Cantor and Packer (1996) identifies various determinants and their impact on the sovereign credit ratings. It analyses the data for 49 countries on various indicators and the ratings provided by Moody's and S&P for the year 1995 and finds that the variables of GDP growth, inflation, and external debt have a significant impact on the sovereign ratings. Moreover, the indicators of economic development and the default history also affect these ratings. Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) , using the Cantor and Packer method, criticize the rating agencies for being unreliable in assigning ratings on the basis of their qualitative judgments rather than the quantitative analysis. Their observation of the ratings assigned to the Asian countries before and after the East Asian Crisis during 1997-98 find them to be pro-cyclical and significantly away from ratings that were predicted by a model using the economic indicators, both before and after the crisis. Moreover, they observe that excessively downgrading the ratings of some of the Asian countries resulted in aggravating the crisis. However, Mora (2006) suggests a more cautious view to the observations made by Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) . She observes that the ratings remain more or less sticky both during and after the East Asian Crisis and are not found to aggravate the boom-bust cycle in the capital market. She also points out that ratings cannot be necessarily countercyclical and hence should be carefully used for regulatory purposes. Rienhart (2001) finds that the rating agencies are not capable of predicting currency or bank crises as the downgrades are never preceded by a crisis. Reisen (2003) finds that the rating models and the determinants used by the rating agencies have not been modified overtime despite the criticism faced by them for not being able to predict the Asian crisis during 1998-99. The sovereign ratings tend to follow the financial markets rather than lead them. This results in an excessive inflow of capital in case of improvement in ratings during a boom and creates a panic among investors and drive the money out of a country if the ratings fall during a bust.
The present paper attempts to check the reliability of the ratings assigned by the two major rating agenciesMoody's and S&P, considering the differences in them. This is done in three steps beginning with the comparison of the ratings assigned by these agencies at two different periods. It is then checked whether the difference in the ratings assigned by these two agencies is significant and responsive for the countries rated by both. Finally, an attempt is made to identify the determinants of ratings for both the agencies using regression analysis of the ratings and some of the commonly used indicators. This is done using the ratings provided by both these agencies in the year 2007 and 2010, and the indicators data set for 2006-07 and 2008-09 respectively.
PROCESS OF SOVEREIGN RATING AND RATING AGENCIES
The process of credit rating of various institutions is a business involving a number of international rating agencies. Both the above mentioned rating agenciesMoody's and S&P -started their operation during early 20th century in 1916 and 1923 respectively by rating the corporate in the US. Later, in 1970, these companies began rating sovereign nations starting with the US, Canada, and Australia (Klein, 2004) . Today, more than 100 nations are being rated for their creditworthiness by these agencies. They are constantly increasing their coverage with time as more and more emerging or developing economies are assigned with the sovereign ratings. There also exists an element of competition among these agencies in the international capital market for being more reliable and consistent in providing accurate ratings to the sovereigns.
Rating Scales
The credit rating agencies use different types of notations to provide ratings to the sovereigns. These notations indicate different levels of rating and hence the level of credit worthiness for different nations. Table 1 shows different notations and the corresponding grades, levels of credit risk, and the capacity to meet financial commitment for Moody's and S&P's. We find from the Table how the interpretations of various ratings are comparable for both the rating agencies. The agencies use different notations; however, every notation used by Moody's has its counterpart in the S&P rating.
Rating Indicators
The credit rating of sovereigns is done using indicators that can be both quantifiable and qualitative in nature. The former implies a list of measures of economic and financial performance and the latter indicates the factors such as political stability. The credit rating agencies use the indicators for quantitative analysis through assigning weights to different indicators/variables in order to decide the ratings and update them by monitoring these variables. Moreover, the agencies do not reveal any details regarding the weights they attach to each of these indicators possibly making the process of quantitative analysis vulnerable to subjective biases. However, these agencies do provide a list of indicators that they consider for their analysis (Moody's, 2004) . A study regarding the determinants of sovereign credit rating by Cantor and Packer (1996) identifies some of the commonly used economic indicators by these two agencies for sovereign ratings. They also provide an explanation of the relationship between each variable and a country's ability to repay the debts.
GDP per capita (US$):
Sovereign ratings are directly correlated to the GDP per capita. A higher level of per capita income indicates a greater potential of the tax base of the borrowing country and hence a greater ability of a government to repay debts. The sovereigns rated high under this factor have high levels of per capita income and the ones with lower level of GDP per capita get lower grades on this count.
Real GDP growth:
A relatively higher rate of economic growth suggests that a country's existing debt burden will become easier to service over time. In a country with growing standard of living and income levels, the gov-ernment has the capacity to withstand economic and political shocks. Thus, it has a better ability to service its debts than the country with a stagnant economy. The countries with advanced level of development, ranking top in the ratings, tend to preclude high levels of growth, whereas, the countries with medium level of speculative grading show high levels of growth due to more policy flexibility and superior economic prospects.
Inflation (Consumer Price Index): High rate of inflation indicates structural problem in the government finance. The inability and unwillingness of the government to pay current budgetary expenses through taxes or debt issuance, compels it to resort to inflationary money finance. Thus high level of inflation in an economy leads to lower level rating assigned and vice-versa. The lower level of inflation is supported by high monetary flexibility in the market due to transparent and well-developed capital market. On the other hand, countries with weak financial sector and relatively shallow capital market are likely to experience high inflation.
Fiscal balance: A large fiscal deficit indicates the unwillingness and inability of the government to tax its citizens to cover the current expenses and service its debts. Scores under this factor are not only the function of surpluses and deficits, but also of revenue and expenditure flexibility and effectiveness of expenditure programmes. Thus lower scores are assigned where government money is not being spent effectively. A higher score is assigned to a sovereign, despite significant financing needs, if the investment in public infrastructure underpins sustainable economic growth.
External balances: A large current account deficit indicates that the public and private sectors together rely heavily on funds from abroad. Current account deficits that persist, result in the growth in foreign indebtedness. The quantitative measure for this indicator is current account balance (cross-border receipts less the cross-border payments) as a percentage of current account receipts (CAR). This ratio tends to be positive for most creditworthy sovereigns and highly negative for the least credit worthy sovereigns.
External debt: For the calculation of external debt, complete international investment position of a country is considered. It includes private sector debts, equity liabilities of public sector, and external indebtedness denominated in local as well as foreign currency. A higher debt burden corresponds to higher risk of defaults. The weight of the burden increases as the country's foreign currency debt rises relatively to the foreign currency earnings. The measure of the magnitude of external debt burden is the ratio of external debt to current account receipts (CAR). A country with higher ratio is likely to face disruption in servicing its debts and hence a fall in its credit ratings.
Economic development:
Although development is already measured by per capita income, the rating agencies consider the relation between economic development and risk. Once a country reaches a certain income or development level, it may be less likely to default.
Default history: -A 'default' in general is the failure to meet a principal or interest payment on due date. A sovereign default occurs when the government either fails to pay scheduled debt service on due date or tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less favourable terms than the original issue. Other factors being equal, the countries that have defaulted on debt in the recent past are considered as high credit risk destinations. Historically, it has been found that the defaulting countries suffer a severe decline in their prestige or in their standing with creditors.
Political Risk and Sovereign Rating
Apart from the quantitative aspect, the analysis also incorporates qualitative aspects due to existence of political and policy developments in the nations. In the case of sovereign creditworthiness, other than the ability, the issue of willingness to repay the debts also becomes crucial. This issue is addressed by the factor of political risk existing in a nation. The stability, predictability, and transparency of the country's political institutions are important considerations in analysing the parameters for economic policymaking, including how quickly policy errors are identified and corrected. The government that is unwilling to repay the debt is usually pursuing economic policies which weaken its ability to repay. The ability and the willingness of the countries to repay their debts vary in the case of local and foreign currency debts. Servicing of the local currency debts is supported by its taxation powers and ability to control domestic monetary and financial system, whereas in the case of foreign currency debts, the country has to secure foreign exchange. A higher grade under this factor implies broad public backing with clear process of succession and transparent conduct of the government also being responsive to changes. Lower grades are given to governments with short track records and considerably less open and less effective governance. Political and external shocks are more likely to disrupt economic policy at lower levels of grading than at the higher level.
Although the political factors are important criteria for sovereign risk analysis, in some cases, significant improvements in fiscal and external performance lead to considerably higher sovereign ratings than the political factors would indicate. Haque, Mark and Mathieson (1998) attempt to examine the relative importance of political and economic variables in determining the country credit ratings. They include the political events as variables in the regression model for econometric analysis to examine their influence. The authors find from their empirical results that the effect of political variables is "orthogonal" and excluding them would not bias the parameter estimates of the economic variables. They conclude that the raters are concerned mainly with the country's ability to repay debts and hence consider the political events only when they affect the same.
Sovereign Rating Comparison: Moody's and S&P
Considering the fact that the indicators/determinants used by these agencies for deciding the ratings are similar, there should be similarity in the ratings assigned by them in case of the commonly rated countries. However, while comparing the rating assigned to the commonly rated countries, we find differences in the ratings of Moody's and S&P. Given in Tables 2a, 2b , and 2c are the list of all the counties in 1995, 2007, and 2010 respectively for which the ratings assigned by both these agencies were found to be different. Following are the findings from the tables:
• In 1995, out of 49 countries being rated by both Moody's and S&P, for 21 (or 41%) countries, the rating levels differed. Out of these, 12 countries were rated higher by S&P and 9 were rated higher by Moody's.
• In 2007, 93 countries were rated by both the agencies out of which 67 (or 70%) had different ratings assigned by these agencies. Moreover in 2007, 66 countries were rated higher by Moody's and only 1 was rated higher by S&P.
• In 2010, 105 countries were rated by both the agencies out of which 77 (73%) had different ratings assigned by these agencies with 74 being rated higher by Moody's and only 3 being rated higher by S&P. • Looking at the average level of rating differences, in 1995, the average rating difference is found to be 1.38 (approx.) which is near to only one level difference, whereas in 2007 and 2011, the average rating differences are found to be 2.60 (approx.) and 2.75 (approx.) that is near 3 levels of difference. Hence, we find a considerable increase in the differences in ratings given by Moody's and S&P over a period of time.
• For all the new countries that have been covered over the years, almost all are rated higher by Moody's than S&P. This implies that the former has been more lenient and responsive while the latter has been more stringent and rigid towards its rating decisions. Looking at the recent changes in these ratings for the period, 2007 to 2010, we find that S&P has changed its ratings for a larger number of countries as compared to Moody's and out of them, a significant number is of countries that have faced a downgrade done only by S&P. Moreover, the upgrades and downgrades done by these two agencies are also of different magnitude and in some cases also in opposite directions. Given the fact that the weights assigned to the indicators by the two agencies are not known, the differences in the ratings could be attributed to the differences in the weights attached to the indicators by the two agencies. It thus becomes important to enquire whether these differences in rating of the two agencies are significant and whether the ratings are responsive to each other. Moreover, it is also relevant to check whether the differences are only due to variation in weights attached by the agencies or due to the existence of qualitative biases developed by the agencies on the basis of subjective criteria. 1 The author is thankful to an anonymous referee who suggested the use of these two methodologies.
RATING ANALYSIS
The analysis of the ratings is done using the ordinary least square (OLS) method. For the purpose of analysis, some other methodologies such as Granger Causality Test and Transition Matrix were also proposed. The former was to bring out the objectivity of the ratings and the latter to point out the probabilities of the changes in the ratings. 1 The Granger Causality Test requires a long and consistent time series data which is usually unavailable in the case of the sovereign credit ratings. Moreover, the Granger Test of Precedence could not be done on such data which is predominantly cross-sectional. The transition matrix would be an 'n x n' matrix with the number of rows and columns (n) being the ratings provided by the agencies. Creating a matrix with n = all the rating levels (currently 25) would not be feasible for analysis purpose; therefore, these rankings will have to be merged into groups, i.e., the first group of all rankings falling in the top investment grades, the second in the medium investment grades, the third in the top speculative grade and so on. However, the problem here with such a matrix would be that the changes in the ratings occur more often from one level to another within the group rather than moving from one group to another. Such a phenomenon, therefore, would not be reflected in the probability of change in ratings but would have a definite impact on the credit standing of the nation in the international financial markets.
The rating analysis through OLS has been done in two different parts. First, it is examined to see whether there are significant differences in the level of ratings assigned by Moody's and S&P and their responsiveness to each other's ratings. Secondly, the relationship between the ratings and the various economic indicators used by these agencies are examined. The analysis is based on the methodology suggested by Cantor and Packer (1996) with some changes being made in the present analysis.
Data and Methodology
The cross-section data for the above indicators is collected from different sources. The data on GDP per capita, real GDP growth, fiscal balances, external balances, and external debt are obtained from the sovereign risk indicators' list provided by S&P. The data on CPI inflation and internal debt are obtained from the World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund, 2008) database and Moody's respectively. The list of developed and developing nations was obtained from the World Bank (2007; list of economies and the list of default history again from . The present analysis is done using the ratings given by the agencies to different countries at two different points in time, i.e., 2007 and 2010. Moreover, the data sets of the economic indicators used in order to examine relationship with the ratings are also for two different points in time -2006-07 and 2008-09 respectively.
For the purpose of regression analysis through OLS (ordinary least square) method, it was required to convert the ratings of both these agencies into the numeric form. This was done on the basis of the method used by Cantor and Packer (1996) to convert the ratings of these two agencies in the year 1995. The lowest rating notations used then by Moody's and S&P were B3 and B-respectively as no country was rated below B3 or B-. Hence, the numeric representation was assigned from 1 for B3 (Moody's) and B-(S&P) to 16 for Aaa (Moody's) and AAA (S&P), the highest rating level. However, for the present analysis, the numeric conversion starts from the lowest level rating as theoretically defined by the two agencies, i.e., 'C3' and 'C-' for Moody's and S&P respectively. These ratings are equated to 1 and moving on to the highest rating for both 'Aaa' (Moody's) and 'AAA' (Standard and Poor's) which would be equivalent to 25. Table 3 gives the respective numeric conversions for each level of rating by both the agencies. where the explanatory variables are: X 1 -GDP per capita (1000 US$) X 2 -Real GDP growth (% annual change) X 3 -Inflation (annual % change) X 4 -Fiscal balance (% of GDP) X 5 -External balance (current account balance/GDP) (%) X 6 -External debt (net external debt/current account receipts) (%) X 7 -Internal debt (net internal debt /GDP) (%) X 8 -Economic development (dummy variable; high income = 1 & non-high income = 0) X 9 -Default history (dummy variable; with default history =1 & without default history = 0) u -Random error term For the dependent variable, Y, the individual ratings given by Moody's and S&P, the average of the ratings assigned by these agencies, and the difference in the ratings for all of the commonly rated countries (Moody's ratings-S&P's ratings) are used as alternatives. The ratings are for the year 2007 and 2010. Table 4 gives the results of the regression of Moody's ratings over the S&P ratings. The values of the intercepts (3.21 and 3.77) indicate a significant difference (at 5% level of significance) in the basic level of ratings between the two agencies. The two-tail test for b=1 results in rejection of the null hypothesis. The responsiveness (0.93 and 0.89) is significantly away from one indicating that a change in the rating by S&P does not lead to an equivalent change in the Moody's ratings. The present evidence raises reasonable doubts regarding the ratings assigned by these agencies being consistent. These agencies use the similar economic indicators as the criteria to decide the ratings but seem to have subjective differences in the weights they attach to these indicators leading to such differences in ratings. Thus, it is important to examine the weights attached and the significance of the indicators used by these agencies to decide the ratings. Tables 5a and 5b show the results of the regressions of the ratings of the two agencies, and the average and difference of ratings in 2007 and 2010 on the same set of indicators in the two data sets of 2006-07 and 2008-09 respectively. Beginning with the results for the average ratings in 2007, we find that GDP per capita, inflation, external debt, internal debt, and the dummy for economic development come out as statistically significant variables (at 5% level). Moreover, these coefficients carry the expected signs. The variables of real GDP change, fiscal balances, and the external balances are found to be insignificant. Regression of the individual ratings of the two agencies over the indicators show that for both Moody's and S&P, the significant variables are the same as in the case of the average ratings. This indicates that it is these set of indicators that determine not only the average ratings but also the individual ratings of both these agencies. Apart from the given set of indicators, the ratings by S&P are also determined by the external balances. However, these variables do not impact Moody's ratings.
Regression Results and Interpretations
Moving to the second set of ratings for 2010, the results for the average ratings of 2010 show that only GDP per capita and internal debt are found to be statistically significant (at 5% level) with the expected signs of the coefficients. All other variables are found to be insignificant. The regression of the individual ratings on the new data set for 2008-09 shows that the variables significant for both the agencies are the same as for the average ratings. Moreover, for this data set, the S&P and Moody's rating are also determined by the dummy for default history and the dummy of economic development respectively. The significant R-square values for all three regressions in both the data sets also indicate a good amount of explanatory power of the selected indicators in explaining variations in individual as well as the average ratings.
The results of the regression clearly indicate that the ratings of these two agencies have more or less the common determinants except the external balances and default history indicator exclusively determining the S&P ratings, and the economic development indicator exclusively determining the Moody's ratings. We may recall from the earlier findings that there is a significant difference in the basic level ratings and also the responsiveness of ratings of one agency (Moody's) to the ratings of the other (S&P).
This can be possible if the weights attached to the determinants are different in case of both the agencies. To check this, we also consider the regression of the difference in ratings over the same indicators. The results show that only the variables of external balances and internal and external debt are found to be significant in 2007. Thus only three of the indicators explain the difference in the ranks given by these two agencies through the weights attached. The differences in the ratings do ap- pear to be caused due to the dissimilarity of the weights attached to indicators. Moreover, a test of significance for the differences in weights of the given set of indicators attached by the two agencies reveals that there is no significant difference in the weights. Further the regression of difference in ratings of 2010 over the indicators in the updated data set shows that none of the indicators are significant. This result implies that the differences in these ratings provided by the two agencies are not explained by any of these variables or the differences in the weights attached to them. Thus, the differences can also be attributed to the weights attached to the subjective criteria used by these agencies in order to decide the ratings. Such criteria imply the qualitative biases built by the agencies against nations on the basis of social and political conditions and their reactions to the news regarding the changes in the capital markets of a nation. These agencies do attach some weights to the qualitative criteria (as mentioned earlier also) while making the rating decisions. However, it appears that they do not have the fixed weights attached to these criteria and are changed according to the non-transparent methodologies of the raters.
CONCLUSION
The sovereign rating comparisons of the two rating agencies -Moody's and S&P -and the analysis of their country ratings and the determinants used by them reveal certain key findings: (i) there has been a considerable increase in the average difference in the ratings provided by these agencies over time; (ii) the difference in the ratings assigned by the two agencies during a given year is statistically significant; (iii) the sovereign rating process followed by the two agencies involves several common indicators determining the rating decisions but for the three indicators that are markedly different; and (iv) the differences in their ratings are also caused due to the subjective assessments of different countries. An exception to this exists for the variables of external balances and external debt as well as internal debt in case of regressions of rating differences over the indicators during 2007 (see Table 5a ). However, the same regression of 2010 rating differences strongly indicates towards this reason as none of the variables are significant. These findings suggest definite subjective differences in the way these agencies weigh different indicators. Not only the differences in weights attached to different indicators by the rating agencies but also the subjective biases in favour or against the nations rated by these agencies, are relevant explanations. Such biases may result in rating changes among agencies sending out wrong signals to the investors, which by itself can aggravate a situation of crisis or a boom. Thus, the present analysis raises doubts regarding the consistency of the rating decisions by the credit rating agencies. Even in terms of communication of facts, the reliability of these ratings is questionable.
Sovereign credit ratings are given considerable importance in the financial markets. These ratings have a special relevance for developing or emerging economies.
There is a significant impact of the sovereign ratings by the specialized rating agencies on the access of developing countries to capital markets. An increase in the ratings of a country improves the terms of borrowing and a decrease worsens it. Considering the assessment of countries by the agencies, there has been no problem for the developed economies, but it is not the case for the developing economies which have a limited access to the capital markets as compared to the developed countries. The degradation in the rating of such countries due to its debt servicing problems or any other negative event further aggravates the economic conditions for the borrowing country (Loser, 2004) . In such a situation, the methodology used and the factors or indicators included in the rating process by these agencies become vital. There seems to be a need for increase in the objectivity of the rating decisions and greater transparency and rationalization of the criteria used by the rating agencies. This would not only make the sovereign ratings more reliable and consistent but also prevent them from contributing negatively. H Dholakia of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad for his useful inputs and comments on the paper. He is also pursuing his doctoral degree from the CEPT University. He has so far published two research papers in national journals as a co-author and one as an independent author. e-mail: shriyengar@gmail.com THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES -ARE THEY RELIABLE? A STUDY OF SOVEREIGN RATINGS thor is also thankful to the anonymous referees of the journal for their insightful and useful suggestions. There are many theoretical explanations for underpricing of IPOs. This is an empirical study which aims to find out the factors which are causing underpricing in India.
R E S E A R C H
The underpricing of IPOs is a serious problem for any economy. On the one hand, high underpricing tendency in the primary market discourages IPOs issued by those companies which cannot afford or do not want underpricing (leaving money on the table). On the other hand, it creates arbitrage activities in the secondary market and in the grey market. The underpricing of IPOs thus hampers the growth opportunities and creates instability in the secondary market.
In India, introduction of book building mechanism of IPOs in 1998 aimed to reduce underpricing because in the book building mechanism, offer price of the issue is determined on the basis of market feedback. The present study on 227 book-built
IPOs for the period of 2004 to 2009 found that the average underpricing during this period was 28 per cent while the maximum underpricing was around 242 per cent.
Thus underpricing of IPOs is still an issue of concern.
